Sunday, 14 April 2019

Why do civilian rulers of Bangladesh have wicked dispositions?


Is it possible that every one of our military rulers had good dispositions, and that every one of our democratically elected rulers had bad dispositions?

This seems farfetched. Instead of appealing to dispositions, explanations along situationist lines would be more illuminating.

First of all, there is no political hatred when politics is in abeyance, almost by definition. Society under military rule was not divided between us and them, ingroup and outgroup. Under military rule, there is no political hatred, simply because there is no politics.

Even in a peaceful democracy like America – invariably held up as a model for the world, ‘the city on the hill’ – democracy creates civic or situational enemies. Even before the election of Donald Trump, more than half of Democrats told pollsters that they were afraid of Republicans and almost half of Republicans said the same about Democrats.

Cass Sunstein observes that in 1960, only about 4 to 5 percent of Republicans and Democrats would be ‘displeased’ if their children married members of the opposite party; now, about 43% of Republicans and 33% of Democrats admit they would be displeased (Against Democracy, p 234).  

Violence is never far below the surface even in the oldest democracy. After a Republican congressman was shot by an unstable gunman last summer, leading Democrats expressed outrage at the idea that their rhetoric had played any part. Yet they used the attempted bombings and the synagogue shooting to begin a debate about the precise degree of presidential responsibility for domestic terrorism.

In the Mother of Parliaments, tribalism has descended like an evil mantle. On June 16, 2016, Labour MP Jo Cox was murdered by a troubled, far-right 52-year-old gardener. Working-class Labour voters, like the ones who put her in Parliament, tend increasingly to be pro-Brexit and nativist. Mrs Cox was a fervent pro-European.

She had complained to the police of abuse, but MPs do not receive police protection. This year, British Members of Parliament were advised to take taxis home, over fears that they could be attacked by members of the public over the handling of Brexit. "Personally, I have never felt this level of tension during my time in the House and I am aware that other colleagues feel the same," wrote the Deputy Speaker in an email. "Many colleagues have already been subject to widely publicized abuse and intimidation."

On January 1, the day after the national elections on December 31, 2018, a mother of four was gang-raped in the city of Noakhali, Bangladesh, for voting for the opposition (Daily Star, January 2, 2019).

“They had repeatedly insisted that I should vote for boat [the symbol of the ruling Awami League] but I cast my ballot for 'sheaf of paddy' [that of the opposition],” she said.

Around a dozen ruling party men armed with sticks entered her house after midnight, tied up her husband and children, took her outside and raped her. The woman alleged the rapists were accomplices of Ruhul Amin, a former member of Char Jubilee Union Parishad.

Her husband said that she had gone to cast her vote at Char Jubilee-14 Government Primary School centre around 11:00 am on Sunday. She took the ballot paper from the assistant presiding officer and went to a booth.

At that time, Ruhul, an Awami League man, insisted she vote for the “boat”. He allegedly tried to snatch the ballot paper as she said she would vote for the “sheaf of paddy”. But she put the paper inside the box.

This made Ruhul furious and he threatened her, he said.

We began this essay with an earlier case of political hatred, as the reader will recall.


Second, and this is closely associated with the above, is the absence of the monopoly of legitimate violence. In his lecture “Politics as a Vocation” (1918), the German sociologist Max Weber defines the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” In short, under democratic rulers, the state is missing in Bangladesh (and India as well, where the RSS, the Bajrang Dal, Shiv Sena and others routinely act outside the state; the use of thugs in politics is widespread, as depicted in the Hindi movie Vaastav (1999)).

Sheikh Mujib had a private army (the Jatiyo Rakhi Bahini), his daughter, Sheikh Hasina, has the Chatra League and Jubo League, her rival, Khaleda Zia, has the Chatra Dal and Jubo Dal. After the slaughter by the Rakhi Bahini in the early ‘70s, we see slaughter again after 1990 – more than 80% of all hartals on this land since 1945 occurred after the miraculous year. Hartals require enormous personnel, in short, a private army.

With General Zia (1977-1981), General Ershad (1983-1990) and General Moeen (2007-2008), the military possessed the monopoly of legitimate violence. By means of democracy, it seems, we have reverted to the Hobbesian state of nature. These men may or may not have had good dispositions, but the situation they were in made for goodness.

Third, we must recall that the quality of the electorate determines the quality of the candidate pool, and ultimately the quality of governments and the rulers. Norman Davies described German voters in the 1930s as “cannibals” who elected a government of “cannibals”. The European elite have been vigilant against the return of this species of voters. In South Asia, the elite, by pandering to the people, have produced toxic rulers.

When extra-judicial killings, disappearances, battery of child and student protesters by student-thugs, allegations of threats to the former Chief Justice’s friend, and so on, and so forth, increase the popularity of the government, it can hardly be faulted for a rational course of action, aimed at maximising votes. After all, it is not Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch that put the party in power, but the people.

On the campaign trail in the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, in speaking of an Australian missionary who had been raped and murdered during a prison riot, lamented that he had not been first in line to abuse her sexually. He treated allegations of his links to vigilante killings in the city of Davao, of which he had been mayor, with pride. And when he promised that he would, as president, dump the corpses of 100,000 gangsters in Manila Bay, the crowd went wild. After he was elected president of the Philippines, the country’s police killed at least 40 suspected criminals in the following two months, more than in the preceding four months combined. A human rights worker, on condition of anonymity for fear of reprisals, told a newspaper that Duterte was “our most popular president since Cory Aquino”.

Thaksin Shinawatra, former prime minister of Thailand, meted out bloody vigilante justice to alleged drug-runners and to government opponents in the Muslim and often strife-torn south of the country. In a shooting spree in 2003, over 2,500 people died in three months, making the prime minister a hero. The police blamed gang violence; human-rights groups accused the government of condoning extra-judicial killings by the security forces. And a panel set up in 2007 by the outgoing junta concluded that over half of those killed in 2003 had no links to the drugs trade. The panel blamed the violence on a government “shoot-to-kill” policy based on flawed blacklists. His popularity was such that it took a military coup to remove him from office. Yet, his mantle passed easily to his sister.

That the quality of voters would determine outcome is an observation as old as democracy itself. Thus we have Plato’s famous lines in The Republic:

“And those who have been of this little company and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics, and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to share their misdeeds and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state, come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others – for all these reasons, I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under the shelter of a wall in a storm of blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope, serene and well content when the end comes (496c-e).”


Compare Thucydides:

“Pericles, indeed, by his rank, ability and known integrity was enabled to exercise an independent control over the multitude –in short, to lead them instead of being led by them;...what was nominally a democracy became in his hands government by the first citizen. With his successors it was different. More on a level with one another, and each grasping at supremacy, they ended by committing even the conduct of state affairs to the whims of the multitude (History of the Peloponnesian War, (trans. Richard Crawley, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952), II-65).”

For Aristotle, democracy is a perversion of constitutional government: “Of the above-mentioned forms, the perversions are as follows: of kingship, tyranny; of aristocracy, oligarchy; of constitutional government, democracy. For tyranny is a kind of monarchy which has in view the interest of the monarch only; oligarchy has in view the interest of the wealthy; democracy, of the needy: none of them the common good of all (Politics, 1279b4-10).” “But when the many administer the state for the common interest, the government is called by the generic name – a constitution (1279a36-37).”

Aristotle’s view of democracy was to have a lasting effect on Europe. According to John Dunn, democracy was “a form of government which simply did not aim at a common good. It was a regime of naked group interest, unapologetically devoted to serving the many at the expense of the wealthier, the better, the more elevated, the more fastidious or virtuous…. Not only was democracy violent, unstable and menacing to those who already had wealth, power or pretension, it was, Aristotle taught many centuries of European speakers to mean, ill-intentioned and disreputable in itself through and through (Setting the People Free, p 50).”

It is interesting to note what Aristotle has to say about democracy, the rule of law, and demagogues. “For in democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens hold the first place, and there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring up. For the people becomes a monarch, and are many in one; and the many have the power in their hand, not as individuals, but collectively…. At all events this sort of democracy, which is now a monarchy, and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows into a despot; the flatterer is held in honour; this sort of democracy is to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens; the decrees of the one correspond to the edicts of the tyrant; and the demagogue is to the one what the flatterer is to the other. Both have great power – the flatterer with the tyrant, the demagogue with democracies of the kind we are describing. The demagogues make the decrees of the people override the laws, by referring all things to the popular assembly…. Such a democracy is fairly open to the objection that it is not a constitution at all; for where the laws have no authority, there is no constitution (1292a6-32).”

We find an echo of this in Byron:

I wish men to be free
As much from mobs as kings—from you as me.

We have seen that democratic practice, such as it is, in South Asia, has been inconsistent with the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. There is nothing axiomatic or universal about the latter: they are values, shared or un-shared, with or without consensus. The question of abortion may be recalled.

It would be tempting to join Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International in their struggle for human rights and the rule of law, but it is a fruitless endeavour. Violation brings popularity, the life-blood of toxic leaders. The followers and the followed are on the same page.

Besides, there is, as always, the problem of translation. Words like ‘democracy’ and ‘rights’ must be translated into the local language. Without going into a detailed analysis, let us consider the famous definition offered by Jacob Zuma as president of South Africa. “You have more rights because you’re a majority; you have less rights because you’re a minority. That’s how democracy works.” Or take the equally revealing translation of the word ‘democracy’ made by Turkey’s toxic president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who said that democracy is like a train; you get off once you have reached your destination.

Words travel; ideas don’t.

We recall that democracy had been a pariah world. Today, we glibly pronounce ‘democracy, human rights and the rule of law’ as somehow entailing each other, a Holy Trinity. But, as Helen Rosenblatt, author of The Lost History of Liberalism: From Ancient Rome to the Twenty-first Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018), points out:

“A common mistake we make today is to use the expression “liberal democracy” unproblematically, as if “liberalism” and “democracy” go together naturally. Sometimes the terms are used interchangeably as if they were synonyms. However, for the first one hundred years of their history, most liberals were hostile to democracy, which they associated with chaos and mob rule. Certainly, the founders of liberalism were not democrats. Although he believed in popular sovereignty, Benjamin Constant insisted that it be limited and advocated stiff property requirements for voting and office holding. Madame de Staël championed the “government of the best,” which she distinguished from democracy.

“To Constant, de Staël, and many other liberals, the French Revolution proved that the public was utterly unprepared for political rights. People were ignorant, irrational and prone to violence. Under popular pressure, the rule of law had been suspended, “enemies of the people” guillotined, and rights trampled upon. Napoleon’s despotic rule, repeatedly legitimized by plebiscite, only confirmed the liberals’ apprehensions about democracy.  They watched with horror as demagogues and dictators manipulated voters by appealing to their lowest instincts. It was obvious to them that the masses lacked the judgement necessary to know their true interests, and even less those of their country. Liberals accepted democracy very late and even then they thought hard about ways to contain it.  They pondered methods to “enlighten” and “educate” democracy and make it safe.”

Clearly, there is a leadership role here for the elite, one that the South Asian elite is incapable of fulfilling, not having got over their colonial hangover. The post-war European elite have shown a sense of responsibility forged in the furnace of history.

In Charles Taylor’s prophetic words, “European societies have tended to follow along behind their elite cultures more than American, we said above. But this effect is magnified at the “European” level, where the running has been entirely made by these elites - with consequences which have emerged recently in referenda in various states on the Continent (A Secular Age, p 831, n 46).”

We have seen Louis Michel’s heroic manoeuvring to side line the Freedom Party, which had Neo-Nazi roots. However, in 2017, the Austrian People’s Party (OVP) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) formed a coalition government with hardly a susurrus from Europe. When the two last formed a government, back in 2000, the news provoked diplomatic sanctions: visits and meetings were cancelled. The Freedom Party has redefined the outgroup as Islam in lieu of their former anti-Semitism (recognising Jerusalem as Israel’s capital long before Donald Trump).

The refugee crisis was, in the argot of psychiatrists, the ‘trigger’ that drove voters into the arms of far-right xenophobes. The sudden upswell of an outgroup, alien in language and religion (though not the latter in Britain), made a salience for the ingroup: nationalist feeling re-emerged. This has strained the compact between the cosmopolitan elite and an increasingly nationalist society.

In 2013 the Alternative for Germany (AfD) fell short of the 5% of votes needed to enter parliament. The party had been founded to oppose EU bail-outs of debt-stricken countries like Greece, which many Germans saw as a transfer from industrious German taxpayers to feckless Greeks. The AfD was then transformed as nationalists took it over and began to rail against immigrants and Islam – an outgroup that afforded greater scope for hostility. Unsurprisingly, the AfD won 13% of the vote in 2017, making it the third-biggest force in parliament, causing some disquiet.

Although the AfD’s agenda is not remotely like that of the Third Reich (people seen giving Nazi salutes have “nothing to do with our party”, said Beatrix von Storch, its deputy leader), a new paper finds an uncomfortable overlap between the parts of Germany that support the AfD and those that voted for the Nazis in 1933.

German expellees after the war flocked to the north, where the Nazis had done well, thus upsetting pre-war demographics. In the south-west, these were preserved. It is only in areas where pre-war demographics still persist that electoral maps show strong echoes of the past. Parts of the south-west that backed the Nazis in 1933 also embraced the AfD, and those that shunned Hitler rejected it. Overall, the paper’s authors found that among municipalities with average far-right support but few expellees, a 1% increase in the Nazis’ vote share in 1933 was associated with an extra 0.3-0.5% gain for the AfD from 2013-17. The Nazis are not coming back, but nationalism has deep roots.

Matteo Salvini, the head of the Northern League, a populist party that forms part of Italy’s governing coalition, has a ready explanation for the global rise of movements like his. “It is a common factor,” he says. “The confrontation of the people versus the elite.”

Scholars agree. Since 1999 the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has surveyed political scientists about European parties’ policy positions and rhetoric, yielding ideological ratings for each party on various issues. The attribute most correlated with gaining votes since 2014 has been criticism of elites.

The repression of nationalism by the European elite has been a Herculean effort at cleansing the Augean stables. Nationalism is a formidable religion, founded on the atavistic human need for ingroup-outgroup hatred, and requiring little or no education, its doctrinal dimension being well-nigh a black hole. Any enterprise built on rational foundations, such as the European Union, and not resting on a visceral myth, will be sorely tested by hoary impulses to the contrary. One can only hope (one is almost tempted to say, pray) for its future.


Whatever may be the future of the European Union, it is an undeniable fact that in certain ‘suitable’ situations, human behaviour will become pathological. “The banality of evil” is one of the most insightful expressions to have come out of our experience of evil.

Toxic leaders do not occur only in politics. They occur in business and non-profits as well, where leaders do not have the coercive power of police, spies and thugs at their disposal. One of the most toxic leaders in history (and much admired by Machiavelli) was the Pope - until one of his followers got up the guts to revolt. More recently, it took nearly fifty years for lay members of the Catholic Church in Boston to call for the ouster of toxic religious leaders involved in the sexual abuse of hundreds of young parishioners (The Allure of Toxic Leaders, p 126).

Leadership is not an action, but an interaction. People seem often to prefer toxic to benign leaders. Lippman-Blumen observes: “During their heyday, Enron’s Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling, WorldCom’s Bernard Ebbers, ImClone’s Samuel Waksal, Tyco International’s L. Dennis Kozlowski, Sunbeam’s Al Dunlap, HealthSouth’s Richard Crushy, Adolf Hitler, Boston’s Roman Catholic Cardinal Bernard Law,  TV evangelist James Bakker, and Texas Tech basketball coach Bobby Knight, for starters, enjoyed – and many still enjoy – enthusiastic support from followers (p 4).”

To this illustrious list may be added such luminaries as Mao Zedong, Pol Pot, Robert Mugabe, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto, Indira Gandhi, Khaleda Zia, Sheikh Hasina, Aung San Suu Kyi, Hugo Chavez, Nicolas Maduro, Recep Tayyip Erdogan….

An example of toxic followers in the corporate world can be given. When a jury convicted Michael R. Milken, the ‘junk bond king’ of investment firm Drexel Burnham Lambert, former DBL employees arrived on Phil Donohue’s TV show. Unanimously, the still unemployed stockbrokers and administrative assistants spoke glowingly of their former boss, despite the fact that Milken’s illegal actions led to the closure of the firm and the loss of their jobs (p 4).

On the fiftieth anniversary of the Cultural Revolution in China, the Communist Party played it down, declaring it a “disaster”. Yet Maoists maintain that the Cultural Revolution was a good idea: China needed one to prevent the kind of slide towards capitalism that the country was now suffering. In May Maoist websites in China published photographs of a meeting of Mao-lovers in Xi’an, the capital of Shaanxi province. “Long Live the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” proclaimed a red banner along one side of the room, where more than 50 people sat in rows before a large portrait of Mao.

Do not look for saints among formal leaders, warns Lipman-Blumen. Saints rarely seek elected or appointed office. She adds that “followers knowingly tolerate, seldom unseat, frequently prefer, and sometimes even creates toxic leaders (p 5).”

The best example of a created toxic leader must be Aung San Suu Kyi. A long-time military prisoner in Burma (Myanmar), she received the Nobel Peace Prize for her heroic determination to bring democracy. However, when hundreds of thousands of Rohingya refugees streamed out of Rakhine state in south-east Burma to Bangladesh, Ms. Suu Kyi (who rules as the only ‘state councillor’, remained shtum. The UN said Myanmar’s treatment of the Rohingya was tantamount to “ethnic cleansing”.

Hatred of the Rohingya is the one thing that unites almost everyone in Myanmar, said another diplomat: “The extremist Buddhists, the masses, the army, and even the NLD [National League for Democracy, Ms. Suu Kyi’s party].” Even somebody of her charisma cannot stand up to her own ingroup against an outgroup perceived as alien. Nyan Win, a party spokesman and Aung San Suu Kyi’s personal lawyer, voiced the views of many in Myanmar when he told Radio Free Asia: “I think everyone knows the Bengali. There are no facial features like Bengalis’ in our Myanmar, nowhere in the country.” The Rohingya are regarded as illegal infiltrators from Bangladesh.

“If the political price of your ascension to the highest office in Myanmar is your silence, the price is surely too steep,” the South African social rights activist and fellow Nobel peace prize winner Desmond Tutu wrote.

When she finally broke her silence, her speech was described by Amnesty International as a “mix of untruths and victim-blaming”.

She found herself at the centre of global ire. Her face again adorns placards at protests across the globe but this time the chants are angry. An attempt to revoke her Nobel peace prize has garnered hundreds of thousands of signatures. More recently, one of South Korea’s largest human rights groups said it will strip Myanmar's de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi of its 2004 Gwangju prize because of her "indifference" to the atrocities against the Rohingya minority.

Thursday, 21 March 2019

Democracy - The Religion And Its Victims



I was an English language teacher at a Catholic seminary in Dhaka on Asad Avenue called the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI). After class, I used to have regular conversations with the rector, Fr. Bejoy D’ Cruz, a short, portly young man with intent eyes.

One afternoon, over a cup of coffee, he was telling me how difficult it had become to recruit young men to the priesthood. He said that young people in the west preferred to join NGOs.

This was a revelation.

We have seen that people in Bangladesh join or set up NGOs for rational reasons – money. However, westerners do the same for the old, extra-rational motives that once directed them to the pews and pulpits. The number of priests and nuns have been declining in the occident, the number of nuns especially so, the total of those not called offset by the increasing ranks from Asia and Africa. All over Europe and North America (albeit, as mentioned, not in Asia and Africa), the numbers of priests and parishioners will continue their remorseless decline, as observed by a newspaper. I started class with eight seminarians, and next year there were sixteen. God has emigrated.

In a conversation with an American priest, Br. Donald, he said it was much better to be here in Bangladesh, where people take religion seriously, than in America.

Charles Taylor, in A Secular Age, discusses the issue of ‘meaning’ as addressed by a French thinker, Luc Ferry (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007, p 677). The latter gives instances of young people who have achieved a strong sense of meaning in their lives through membership of Medecins Sans Frontieres, but ‘horizontally’, not ‘vertically’. No doubt, similar observations can be made about membership of other NGOs, like Amnesty International or Article 19. Thus, people find meaning in their lives through something greater than themselves, without being other-worldly. But they, nevertheless, manifest a need for transcendence.

Again, the same writer observes the mobilisation of resources in the event of a distant calamity, such as a flood or earthquake. He attributes this outpouring of empathy not only to the media and methods of transportation and the fact of economic plenitude, but something less tangible, not unconnected to the Christian past. “The same media and means of transport don’t awaken the same response everywhere; it is disproportionately strong in ex-Latin Christendom (p 371).”

Taylor observes that new forms arise in history in spiritual traditions which are carried forward and reshaped so that subsequent periods show the same spiritual inclinations in a revised, but mirrored form. “I have argued that this is true for exclusive humanism in relation to Christian faith, in the centrality of benevolence, for instance. I have even argued that exclusive humanism couldn’t have arisen without this analogue to agape. (pp 679-680)” Indeed, religion is reconstituted.

A similar line of thought emerges in Democracy in Europe, by Larry Siedentop (Harmondsworth: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 2000). More interesting than Taylor, Siedentop traces democracy to Christianity. He observes: “For the Christian God survives in the assumption that we have access to the nature of things as individuals. That assumption is, in turn, the final justification for a democratic society, for a society organised to respect the equal underlying moral status of all its members, by guaranteeing each ‘equal liberty’. That assumption reveals how the notion of ‘Christian liberty’ came to underpin a radically new ‘democratic’ model of human association (p 194, italics original)”.

“Mediaeval noblemen did not believe in individualism”, observes Yuval Noah Harari in Sapiens (Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Croydon: Vintage, 2014, p 128). One’s place in the social hierarchy determined one’s worth. Teenage sons of barons did not have private rooms on the second floor of the castle “with posters of Richard the Lionheart and King Arthur on the walls”, let alone a locked door closed to parental supervision. He slept with other boys in a large hall, always on display and always alert to what others saw and said. It was the hierarchy and others’ perception of him that determined his true worth.

The individual makes his first appearance through Machiavelli and Luther, according to Alasdair McIntyre (A Short History of Ethics, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, p 121). “For the first time, the Absolute Individual confronts the Absolute State” wrote J.N.Figgis, as quoted by McIntyre, of the period after the Reformation (p 124).

Siedentop bemoans the lack of shared beliefs in Europe and the lack of democracy (hence the title, deliberately echoing Tocqueville’s book). The latter is due to the former, for which he blames anti-clericalism and multiculturalism (sometimes together).

Anti-clericalism hardly consists with this benign view of Christianity. Christianity has been consistent with persecution, autos-da-fe, slavery, serfdom, absolutism, war, racism, capitalism, and, today, democracy (as he claims). Siedentop takes anti-clericalism as an unfortunate aspect of European culture today without querying its origins, motivation and legitimacy. In recent times, clerical sexual abuse of children as well as nuns, along with the concomitant cover-ups, have confirmed the worst suspicions of the anti-clerical.

“Thus, the defining characteristic of Christianity was its universalism. It aimed to create a single human society, a society composed, that is, of individuals rather than tribes, clans or castes.” It is Christian ontology that undergirds liberal values. The primary and foundational commitments to equality, reciprocity and individual freedom are constitutive of Western society; the commitments to tolerance, pluralism and scepticism are derivative and secondary (p 210).

Siedentop claims that Christianity, unlike other faiths, “interiorizes God”. Christianity is not a social group worshipping itself a la Durkheim, but a social group premised on the individual as a free agent. This interiorization is the source of conscience and a sphere of choice protected by human rights. “That is the kernel of truth embedded in the Protestant version of Christianity – the kernel which makes it plausible to claim that Protestantism, for all its aberrations, is a more self-conscious form of Christianity than Catholicism (p 211).”

Islam, and multiculturalism, come in for heavy criticism. Clearly, Islam is deficient and defective, and its values “abhorrent”. Islam prioritises men over women, fathers over daughters, husbands over wives (curiously Siedentop doesn’t expend much energy on Hinduism which as we have seen, is characterised by the Homo hierarchicus; the sex ratio at birth in Bangladesh, a Muslim country, is 1.04 males per female, while in India it is 1.12 males per female, a result of female foeticide unknown in Bangladesh. When Nehru passed away, his daughter, Indira, was not able to light the funeral pyre; that duty fell to Indira’s son, Sanjay. Son-preference runs deep in India (Nehru: A Political Biography (p 7)).

Mahima, gang-raped by ruling party student-thugs, was a simple Muslim girl – young, but nevertheless deficient for being Muslim. A Christian, European girl would not have killed herself because her society would regard her as a person first, a woman, a daughter, a wife, second. Failing the family honour (a collective sentiment) would have been intolerable, a social death. She chose an actual death.

Siedentop approves of the “superb” spread of the language of human rights throughout the world, constituting an almost universal culture, the “ultimate and least resistible form of Western influence, something which must appear to defenders of other faiths as the last form of Western imperialism (p 213)”.

We have seen throughout this essay that the pursuit of democracy and the pursuit of human rights have been at odds in Bangladesh, and indeed, in South Asia. Assault and battery of children protesters, extrajudicial killings and disappearances, far from denting the popularity of an elected government, in fact augments is. Nor is the issue of human rights free of incoherence: the right of the foetus versus the right of a woman to abortion are vehemently disputed issues even in the West. The rights of workers to job security vary between continental capitalism and Anglo-Saxon capitalism, and so on. Torture seems to be employed even by liberal regimes whenever national security is threatened.

As one would expect from someone who believes in universal values, Siedentop maintains that “the only form of Western imperialism that remains legitimate is ideological (p 188)”.

Interestingly, no other civilisation seems to wish to project its values onto the world, no doubt because these values are parochial and particularistic. The reader will have noticed that criticism of democracy in these pages have come from anthropologists, who are necessarily interested in the parochial and particular (and one politician philosopher, similarly focussed on the empirical and real).

The time has come to raise the all-important question (‘the million-dollar question’ if not so many lives had been involved): Despite all the evidence, from political psychologists, social psychologists, journalists, historians, anthropologists…despite all the evidence, why does this faith in democracy endure – in the west? (In Bangladesh, we have looked at both rational and irrational reasons for such faith).

Happily, the European elite have fewer illusions about democracy. Jean Monnet has been quoted by The Economist as having “thought it wrong to consult the peoples of Europe about the structure of a community of which they had no practical experience”. However, the European Union vigorously champions democracy in Bangladesh, even going to the extent of whitewashing fake elections (with the Carter Centre, as we saw above). And even as Jeanne Kirkpatrick was writing her classic essay on dictatorship and double standards, she observed that “No idea holds greater sway in the mind of educated Americans than the belief that it is possible to democratise governments, anytime and anywhere, under any circumstances.”

The invaluable question was posed in the 1930s by Joseph Schumpeter in his book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1950): “But how is it possible that a doctrine so patently contrary to fact should have survived to this day and continued to hold its place in the hearts of the people and in the official language of governments? The refuting facts are known to all; everybody admits them with perfect, frequently with cynical, frankness. The theoretical basis, utilitarian rationalism, is dead; nobody accepts it as a correct theory of the body politic. Nevertheless, that question is not difficult to answer (pp 264 – 265).”

Before answering the question, Schumpeter presents arguments against the eighteenth-century view of democracy, which he defines as “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will (p 250)”. Then he draws the implications of the definition.

He affirms that there is no common good which everyone can be persuaded to accept by rational considerations. On the level of the individual will, we, in a democracy, will have to attribute to it a level of independence and rationality that are “altogether unrealistic”, meaning, anti-empirical.     

“Everyone would have to know definitely what he wants to stand for. This definite will would have to be implemented by the ability to observe and interpret correctly the facts that are directly accessible to everyone and to sift critically the information about the facts that are not. Finally, from that definite will and from these ascertained facts a clear and prompt conclusion as to particular issues would have to be derived according to the rules of logical inference—with so high a degree of general efficiency moreover that one man’s opinion could be held, without glaring absurdity, to be roughly as good as every other man’s (pp 253 – 254).” And all this the citizen would have to accomplish by herself, ‘unaided’ by pressure groups or propaganda.

Under the rubric “Human Nature in Politics”, Schumpeter begins thus: “It remains to answer our question about the definiteness and independence of the voter’s will, his powers of observation and interpretation of facts, and his ability to draw, clearly and promptly, rational inferences from both. This subject belongs to a chapter of social psychology that might be entitled Human Nature in Politics (p 256).”

The reader will recall the title of the book by Graham Wallas mentioned before under the heading ‘The Irrational’. Schumpeter recommends the book as “the best introduction to political psychology”. (He takes Wallas to task for not taking his own premises to their logical conclusion!)

He gives a brief history of the demolition of the ‘rational’ individual. “During the second half of the last century, the idea of the human personality that is a homogeneous unit and the idea of a definite will that is the prime mover of action have been steadily fading—even before the times of Théodule Ribot and of Sigmund Freud. In particular, these ideas have been increasingly discounted in the field of social sciences where the importance of the extra-rational and irrational element in our behavior has been receiving more and more attention, witness Pareto’s Mind and Society. Of the many sources of the evidence that accumulated against the hypothesis of rationality, I shall mention only two.”

The first he mentions is the name of Gustav Le Bon, the pioneer in the study of the psychology of crowds (psychologie des foules). Schumpeter extends the denotation of ‘crowd’ to include “every parliament, every committee, every council of war” for they share with the rabble “a reduced sense of responsibility, a lower level of energy of thought and greater sensitiveness to non-logical influences”.

“Moreover, those phenomena are not confined to a crowd in the sense of a physical agglomeration of many people. Newspaper readers, radio audiences, members of a party even if not physically gathered together are terribly easy to work up into a psychological crowd and into a state of frenzy in which attempt at rational argument only spurs the animal spirits (p 257).”

The second source he mentions is, in some ways, more illuminating. “Economists, learning to observe their facts more closely, have begun to discover that, even in the most ordinary currents of daily life, their consumers do not quite live up to the idea that the economic textbook used to convey.” He has, in fact, anticipated the discipline known today as Behavioural Economics. As we have seen, Richard H. Thaler draws a distinction between Econs and Humans, the former being the fictional creature of economic theory and the latter the flesh-and-blood people of everyday life. Just as the rational individual is a textbook fiction, so the rational citizen is an ideological construct.

In the next section, Schumpeter asks his invaluable question. His answer is equally invaluable.

“First of all, though the classical doctrine of collective action may not be supported-by the results of empirical analysis, it is powerfully supported by that association with religious belief to which I have adverted already. This may not be obvious at first sight. The utilitarian leaders were anything but religious in the ordinary sense of the term. In fact they believed themselves to be anti-religious and they were so considered almost universally. They took pride in what they thought was precisely an unmetaphysical attitude and they were quite out of sympathy with the religious institutions and the religious movements of their time. But we need only cast another glance at the picture they drew of the social process in order to discover that it embodied essential features of the faith of protestant Christianity and was in fact derived from that faith. For the intellectual who had cast off his religion the utilitarian creed provided a substitute for it. For many of those who had retained their religious belief the classical doctrine became the political complement of it (p 265).”

This explains why democracy is beyond criticism and rational evaluation: the dissident is not only wrong, but morally wrong, a heretic, as was the case with Marxism.
“It actually becomes what from another standpoint I have held it incapable of becoming, viz., an ideal or rather a part of an ideal schema of things. The very word may become a flag, a symbol of all a man holds dear, of everything that he loves about his nation whether rationally contingent to it or not. On the one hand, the question how the various propositions implied in the democratic belief are related to the facts of politics will then become as irrelevant to him as is, to the believing Catholic, the question how the doings of Alexander VI tally with the supernatural halo surrounding the papal office. On the other hand, the democrat of this type, while accepting postulates carrying large implications about equality and brotherliness, will be in a position also to accept, in all sincerity, almost any amount of deviations from them that his own behavior or position may involve. That is not even illogical. Mere distance from fact is no argument against an ethical maxim or a mystical hope (p 266).”

Aldous Huxley made similar observations about democracy, the religion. “The word [democracy] conjures up ideas of universal liberty and happiness. The hearer feels an expansive emotion, a pleasing enlargement of his personality, following on the idea of the loosening of restraints. He can be moved by repetition of the word to take violent action (A Few Well-chosen Words, Aldous Huxley: Complete Essays, Volume II, 1926-1929, ed. Robert S. Baker and James Sexton, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), pp 59 - 60).”

These words were prescient. Violent action has indeed been taken to spread the faith across the Middle East. However, when a Palestinian uses the word ‘democracy’, he means oppression. When a Rohingya refugee fleeing from newly-democratic Burma hears the world, it is safe to assume that no pleasant associations come to his or her mind.

Huxley continues: “As a matter of historical fact, however, democracy has come to mean, not universal liberty, but the absolute rule of majorities. In republican America the formula of democracy is: Agree with the majority, or clear out.” He writes like a contemporary observer of American politics.

Huxley, too, was aware of the sacred nature of democracy. He writes: “Only the most mystically fervent democrats, who regard voting as a kind of religious act, and who hear the voice of God in that of the People, can have any reason to desire to perpetuate a system whereby confidence tricksters, rich men, and quacks may be given power by the votes of an electorate composed in a great part of mental Peter Pans, whose childishness renders them peculiarly susceptible to the blandishments of demagogues and the tirelessly repeated suggestions of the rich men’s newspapers (Political Democracy, p 228).” (When I quoted these words to an English friend of mine, he said, “Was he on mescaline?”. Huxley was writing six years before Hitler’s electoral success.)

We have seen that political and social psychologists have confirmed his view about “mental Peter Pans”, and as for the rich men, Bernie Sanders thundered “We allowed rich people to buy the US government”. He said that he didn’t have a super PAC, through which the rich channel their donations. By August 2015, he had raised $15.2 million dollars from 350,000 supporters, who, on average, contributed $31. Last year, Jeremy Corbyn referred to the “stranglehold of elite power and billionaire domination over large parts of our media”.

Schumpeter and Huxley noted the anti-empiricism mentioned above, infecting not only the layman but also the historian (such as Ayesha Jalal). Like Siedentop, Schumpeter traces democratic values back to Christianity, but without the former’s glorification. “Thus transposed into the categories of religion, this doctrine—and in consequence the kind of democratic persuasion which is based upon it— changes its very nature. There is no longer any need for logical scruples about the Common Good and Ultimate Values. All this is settled for us by the plan of the Creator whose purpose defines and sanctions everything. What seemed indefinite or unmotivated before is suddenly quite definite and convincing. The voice of the people that is the voice of God for instance. Or take Equality. Its very meaning is in doubt, and there is hardly any rational warrant for exalting it into a postulate, so long as we move in the sphere of empirical analysis. But Christianity harbors a strong equalitarian element. The Redeemer died for all: He did not differentiate between individuals of different social status. In doing so, He testified to the intrinsic value of the individual soul, a value that admits of no gradations. Is not this a sanction—and, as it seems to me, the only possible sanction —of “everyone to count for one, no one to count for more than one”—a sanction that pours super-mundane meaning into articles of the democratic creed for which it is not easy to find any other (p 265)?”

The goodness of democracy is thereby ‘evidence-transcendent’, for it is God’s plan for humanity. We have seen how Charles Taylor conceived of the reconstitution of religion in the secular. Nineteenth century Europe was a time of secular religions: nationalism, Marxism and democracy each arrived as new religions for a new society.  (Even among Arabs, faith in the fundamental goodness of democracy was in full display in 2011, notwithstanding the clear and contradictory evidence of Iraq.)

A ‘secular religion’, far from being an oxymoron, is an identifiable social phenomenon. According to Ninian Smart, in his book The World’s Religions (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1989, pp 10 ‎‎- 25), every religion has seven characteristics, or dimensions. We tick them off one by one, with respect to nationalism:

(1) the ritual dimension: speaking the language, saluting the flag, national holidays,  pilgrimages to sights considered important; (2) the experiential or emotional dimension: nationalism has a powerful emotional side, a fact that seems to me to explain why children are peculiarly susceptible to it, as during the Chinese May 4th Movement, or the 21st February 1952 students’ movement in the then-East Pakistan (today Bangladesh); these emotions are always kept simmering below the surface through patriotic or heroic songs, dramas…(3) the narrative dimension is obvious in nationalism: the history of the nation; the stories (fictionalized, or embellished) of great men, women and even children who made the nation what it is; (4) unlike the emotional dimension, nationalism lacks a strong doctrinal dimension, reinforcing my observation that the power of the emotional aspect renders nationalist sentiments peculiarly appealing to children; however, nationalism can appeal to a set of doctrines, such as democracy, individual freedom and rights (or it could appeal to purely religious doctrines as well); (5) the ethical dimension of nationalism refers to loyalty to the nation, martial values needed during defense (or offence), family values (to provide soldiers); (6) the social and institutional aspect of the nation-state consists in such public figures as the head of state, the army and its military ceremonies, the education system – a formidable apparatus for collective indoctrination – and even in games (the Olympics is the egregious example); (7) finally, the material dimension of religion are the physical monuments and artistic objects that have been created by the ‘nation-builders’.


Smart then goes on to adumbrate the seven dimensions of Marxism.

It should be clear to the reader that democracy, like nationalism and Marxism, has similar characteristics:

(1) First, there’s the ritual dimension of the quinquennial vote, the municipal and local elections, the swearing-in ceremonies....At election time, the people come together. Voters vote for the national good (however ill-equipped they are to determine this) and not just for their narrow self-interest (Against Democracy, p 49). There is a period of transcendence at election time, lasting several weeks, if not months. (2) Then there’s the experiential or emotional aspect: every election is preceded by months of campaigning during which euphoria and heightened expectations prevail. (3) The narrative or mythical dimension of democracy is fairly obvious: there’s the identification over 2,500 years with Cleisthenes and Greek democracy, the Glorious Revolution, the American Revolution….Locally, there is the identification with those who overthrew a 'tyrant': in Bangladesh, December 6, 1990 is recalled every year as the day General Ershad was overthrown by brave boys (who were in reality thugs, but never mind); in America, the 4th of July serves a similar purpose. (4) Democracy, more than nationalism, has a far richer doctrinal dimension, ranging from - to take an arbitrary span - the treatises of John Locke to the output of John Stuart Mill. (5) The ethical dimension: values (observed in the breach) of tolerance, equality, accountability, are inculcated in voters. (6) The social and institutional aspects of democracy stand out – literally: there’s the elected President or Prime Minister with his or her regalia and elaborate ceremonies; the ‘people’ are represented through popular songs, dances, dramas, poetry and folk-tales. (7) The material embodiment of democracy is often magnificent: in Bangladesh there’s the Assembly Building designed by Louis Kahn; The Capitol, the White House and Westminster Palace are imposing monuments to democracy. As de Tocqueville observed: “Nowhere do citizens appear so insignificant as in a democratic nation; nowhere does the nation itself appear greater, or does the mind more easily take in a wide general survey of it. In democratic communities the imagination is compressed when men consider themselves; it expands indefinitely when they think of the State. Hence it is that the same men who live on a small scale in narrow dwellings, frequently aspire to gigantic splendor in the erection of their public monuments (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Henry Reeve, Book 2, Chapter 12).” Not surprisingly, even democratic architecture conduces to a feeling of transcendence.


The highest level of human growth, according to Abraham Maslow, is that of transcendence. Transcendence, for Maslow, encompasses the need to rise above the interests of the self, to find fulfilment in helping others reach their potential (The Allure of Toxic Leaders, p 129).

According to Jean Lipman-Blumen, control myths are rationalisations that use to persuade ourselves to act or desist from acting, and these are deep-buried in our subconscious existential, psychological and psychosocial needs. “Both because of and despite the fact that they travel incognito, these powerful control myths prevent us from even attempting to overthrow toxic leaders (p 130).” She lists several control myths, but the most powerful and positive ones come at the end, or at the top, for they promise ennoblement and immortality, thus speaking to the needs that Maslow describes as self-esteem, self-actualisation and transcendence. A few samples follow (pp 135-136).

“This leader is an unique being. Participating in his/her vision will make me unique, too.” (Self-esteem and belonging; self-actualisation and transcendence.)

“Whatever promises the leader makes will come true.” (Safety)

“This leader’s vision is so ennobling, I would follow her to the ends of the earth.” (Self-actualisation and transcendence)

“When I am part of the leader’s group, I can do no wrong.” (Aesthetic [order, symmetry and beauty]; self-actualisation and transcendence)

“Being part of the leader’s group fills me with a sense of doing something really important.” (Cognition and transcendence)

“The vision is worth any sacrifice.” (Transcendence)

“Attaining the vision through my heroic efforts will earn me immortality.” (Transcendence)

The writer adds: “Believing in the special, god-like qualities of the leader makes it difficult to evaluate his claims to mana.”

“They beat her to death with their clubs,” wrote a student about his teacher. “It was immensely satisfying.”

“The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolutionary bugle to advance” first sounded 52 years ago, on May 16th 1966, when Mao approved a secret circular declaring war on “representatives of the bourgeoisie” who had “sneaked into the Communist Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture”. Between May 1966 and Mao’s death in 1976, which in effect ended the Cultural Revolution, over 1 million died, millions more were banished from urban homes to the countryside and tens of millions were humiliated or tortured.

How could an entire nation follow a toxic leader like Mao Zedong? Jean Marie-Lupmen has a few answers. She also explains the allure of toxic leaders in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and other places like Cambodia and the Soviet Union. 

Mao stood on the threshold of Paradise, Communism, the end of prehistory and the beginning of history. A few million deaths seemed a paltry sacrifice in a cost-benefit analysis. He stood at the terminus of human civilisation, the Prophet over the Promised Land, with his eager Communist disciples.

Charles Taylor, although the winner of the Templeton Prize, is clear-eyed about the history of Christianity, unlike Siedentop, and the dangers to the devout. He observes:

“So religious faith can be dangerous. Opening to transcendence is fraught with peril. But this is particularly so if we respond to these perils by permanent closure, drawing an unambiguous boundary between the pure and the impure through the polarization of conflict, even war. That religious believers are capable of this, history amply attests. But atheists can as well, once they open themselves to strong ideals, such as a republic of equals, a world order of perpetual peace, or communism. We find the same self-assurance of purity through aggressive attack on “axes of evil”, among believers and atheists alike. Idolatry breeds violence (p 769).”

Bertrand Russell once wrote: “Belief in democracy, however, like any other belief, may be carried to the point where it becomes fanatical and therefore harmful (‘Ideas That Have Harmed Mankind’, Unpopular Essays (Bombay: Blackie & Son (India) Ltd, 1979), p. 149).”

But belief in democracy is not like any other belief, just as belief in the goodness of God and His plans for humanity is not like any other belief. Belief in the goodness of democracy is evidence-transcendent: it exists despite all evidence to the contrary. Brennan insists, time and again, that “democracy is not a poem or painting (p 125)”, that it must be evaluated just as we would evaluate a hammer, as a means to an end, not an end in itself (p 14). In this, he harks backs to Schumpeter’s contention that we must be able to discuss democracy “rationally like a steam engine or a disinfectant (p 266).”

And we have seen that, in Bangladesh, belief in democracy, unlike any other belief today, may be carried to the point where it becomes fanatical and therefore highly profitable. For a section of our intelligentsia, belief in democracy is extremely rational.

Take a contemporary and pressing instance of the disjunction between democratic reality and democratic faith. It comes from Latin America, where the Latinobarometro survey reported in the Economist shows great dissatisfaction with democracy and a simultaneous preference for democracy!

The proportion of people who are dissatisfied with how democracy works has jumped from 51% in 2009 to 71%. The share that is content has dropped from 44% to 24%, its lowest level since the survey began more than two decades ago. However, more than half say that it is better than any other system, though that has dropped by 13 percentage points over the past eight years. The share who are neutral has risen from 16% in 2010 to 28%.

The chasm between reality and aspiration is deepest in Venezuela, where more than half the people say they do not have enough to eat. Although just 12% of Venezuelans are happy with how their “democracy” functions, 75% prefer democracy to any other system. Yet it was the democratically elected Hugo Chavez and his successor Nicolas Maduro who helped to take the food out of their mouths. Millions voted with their feet.

(On the other hand, Nigerians have turned out to be more rational: in the 2015 presidential election, turnout was just 43%; in the last one, it dropped to 35.6%. Nigerians have learned from experience, and they may also have been doing a little basis arithmetic: the value of a vote is 1 divided by the number of voters – a value almost equalling zero, which makes voting irrational (Against Democracy, p 110).)

A variant of theodicy seems to be at work in appraising democracy. On the cusp of religion and politics, I turn for assistance to a poet, Edmund Blunden, and his heart-wrenching poem, Report on Experience.


I have been young, and now am not too old;
And I have seen the righteous forsaken,
His health, his honour and his quality taken.
     This is not what we were formerly told.

I have seen a green county, useful to the race,
Knocked silly with guns and mines, its villages vanished,
Even the last rat and last kestrel banished―
     God bless us all, this was peculiar grace.

I knew Seraphina ; Nature gave her hue,
Glance, sympathy, note, like one from Eden.
I saw her smile warp, heard her lyric deaden;
     She turned to harlotry;― this I took to be new.

Say what you will, our God sees how they run.
These disillusions are his curious proving
That he loves humanity and will go on loving;
     Over there are faith, life, virtue in the sun.


There can be no quarrel with the last quatrain, just as there can be none with the first three: this tension is part and parcel of religious faith. But when we ask why sixteen-year-old Ripon Sikder had to be burned alive in a hartal, taking eleven days to die, it is not our faith in God, but our faith in democracy, that is, or should be, shaken.  

“’They were only war casualties,” he said. “It was a pity, but you can’t always hit your target. Anyway they died in the right cause.’

‘“Would you have said the same if it had been your old nurse with her blueberry pie?”

“He ignored my facile point. ‘In a way you could say, they died for democracy.’”

Readers will recall this exchange between the English journalist Thomas Fowler, the narrator, and the undercover OSS agent, Arden Pyle, in The Quiet American by Graham Greene (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1955, p 179).


In the event, 4-5 million Vietnamese men, women and children died for democracy. When one has God on one’s side, and the others don’t, it is legitimate to kill.

Fowler’s facile point about “your old nurse with her blueberry pie” raises the essential question: what if he/she were one of ‘us’, and not one of ‘them’?

Charles Taylor similarly raises the essential question: “And sympathy can so easily be blocked by ideology, even (though rarely) in the case of one’s own children, but certainly when it comes to others (A Secular Age, p 701)”. With the followers of Jim Jones, we have seen that sympathy can be blocked even in the case of one’s own children.

In Party Animals: My Family and Other Communists, David Aaronovitch details his parents’ love of the Soviet Union and Communism. Anything could be justified to a true believer, even Stalinism. “Perhaps there are children of very devout Muslims or evangelicals who will read this and nod along,” he muses.

Monday, 11 March 2019

Toxic Leaders in South Asia - Why We Follow Them


The highest level of human growth, according to Abraham Maslow, is that of transcendence. Transcendence, for Maslow, encompasses the need to rise above the interests of the self, to find fulfillment in helping others reach their potential (Jean Lipman-Blumen, The Allure of Toxic Leaders: Why We Follow Destructive Bosses and Corrupt Politicians – and How We Can Resist Them (Oxford: Oxford University Press) p 129).

According to Lipman-Blumen, control myths are rationalisations that we use to persuade ourselves to act or desist from acting, and these are deep-buried in our subconscious existential, psychological and psychosocial needs. “Both because of and despite the fact that they travel incognito, these powerful control myths prevent us from even attempting to overthrow toxic leaders (p 130).” She lists several control myths, but the most powerful and positive ones come at the end, or at the top, for they promise ennoblement and immortality, thus speaking to the needs that Maslow describes as self-esteem, self-actualisation and transcendence. A few samples follow (pp 135-136).

“This leader is an unique being. Participating in his/her vision will make me unique, too.” (Self-esteem and belonging; self-actualisation and transcendence.)

“Whatever promises the leader makes will come true.” (Safety)

“This leader’s vision is so ennobling, I would follow her to the ends of the earth.” (Self-actualisation and transcendence)

“When I am part of the leader’s group, I can do no wrong.” (Aesthetic [order, symmetry and beauty]; self-actualisation and transcendence)

“Being part of the leader’s group fills me with a sense of doing something really important.” (Cognition and transcendence)

“The vision is worth any sacrifice.” (Transcendence)

“Attaining the vision through my heroic efforts will earn me immortality.” (Transcendence)

The writer adds: “Believing in the special, god-like qualities of the leader makes it difficult to evaluate his claims to mana.”

“They beat her to death with their clubs,” wrote a student about his teacher. “It was immensely satisfying.”

“The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolutionary bugle to advance” first sounded 52 years ago, on May 16th 1966, when Mao approved a secret circular declaring war on “representatives of the bourgeoisie” who had “sneaked into the Communist Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture”. Between May 1966 and Mao’s death in 1976, which in effect ended the Cultural Revolution, over 1 million died, millions more were banished from urban homes to the countryside and tens of millions were humiliated or tortured.

How could an entire nation follow a toxic leader like Mao Zedong? Jean Marie-Lupmen has a few answers. She also explains the allure of toxic leaders in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India and other places like Cambodia and the Soviet Union.  

Mao stood on the threshold of Paradise, Communism, the end of prehistory and the beginning of history. A few million deaths seemed a paltry sacrifice in a cost-benefit analysis. He stood at the terminus of human civilisation, the Prophet over the Promised Land, with his eager Communist disciples.

Charles Taylor, although the winner of the Templeton Prize, is clear-eyed about the history of Christianity, unlike Larry Siedentop, and the dangers to the devout. He observes:

“So religious faith can be dangerous. Opening to transcendence is fraught with peril. But this is particularly so if we respond to these perils by permanent closure, drawing an unambiguous boundary between the pure and the impure through the polarization of conflict, even war. That religious believers are capable of this, history amply attests. But atheists can as well, once they open themselves to strong ideals, such as a republic of equals, a world order of perpetual peace, or communism. We find the same self-assurance of purity through aggressive attack on “axes of evil”, among believers and atheists alike. Idolatry breeds violence (A Secular Age (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007) p 769).”

Sunday, 3 March 2019

Thuggocracy In India


The use of thugs in Indian politics is wide-spread, acknowledged and accepted.

Take the world’s largest volunteer organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an epitome of civil society. Founded in 1925, the flagship of Hindutva today has an all-male membership of 5 million. Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, served as an RSS pracharak (a member of a hard core of RSS apostles). According to The Economist: “Some RSS groups exercise quiet influence, lobbying for more “nationalist” economic policy, for instance. Others simply wield muscle. The 2m-member Bajrang Dal, a youth branch of the World Hindu Council, an RSS offshoot, has a reputation for beating up Muslim boys who dare to flirt with Hindu girls. The 3m-strong All India Students Council is aggressive in campus politics. By threat or violent action it frequently blocks events it does not like, such as lectures by secular intellectuals. Just outside the orbit of the RSS lie violent extremist groups, such as one believed responsible for murdering leftist writers.”

At the state level, take Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal, and her Trinamool Congress party. The TMC machine, which critics say is backed in many areas by local criminal gangs, wields an intimidating presence in a state that has long been coloured by political violence. It is often said that whoever controls the ballot box controls the election. It does not help that the state police are seen as subservient to the party. Tales of corruption and extortion under the TMC are rife, and criminality by TMC street thugs has turned poor voters against the the party. Before the election of 2016, aware of West Bengal’s propensity for politically motivated violence, India’s national election commission took vigorous steps. Besides staggering the votes over several weeks, it replaced local police chiefs and election officials with its own functionaries, mounted mobile and stationary patrols and rounded up suspected thugs.  Consequently, the election was the most peaceful in West Bengal’s recent memory. Ms. Banerjee was not pleased. (Nor was the previous lot saintly: after the crushing defeat of the communist-led Left Front – in power for 34 years – in 2011, much of its street muscle went over to Ms. Banerjee.)

When Uber and Ola drivers went on strike last year in Mumbai, the strike was rendered highly effective by the strength of powerful unions, in particular one called Maharashtra Rajya Rashtriya Kamgar Sangh. Thousands would have crossed picket lines but for their colleagues who maintained solidarity by, for example, forcing strikebreakers to strip naked or by smashing their phones. Dozens trying to work were beaten up and their cars damaged.



One of the architects of the destruction of the Babri Mosque in December, 1992 was L K Advani. The breaking of the mosque triggered riots in which an estimated 1,000 people died. He  became home minister (twice) and then deputy prime minister. About the state elections in Gujarat in 2002, Kuldip Nayar, an Indian columnist, pointed out that Chief Minister of Gujarat Narendra Modi “did best in the area where he planned and executed ethnic cleansing” – a swing of 18 per cent in central Gujarat and 11 per cent in the north. Altogether, the BJP won 126 seats in the 182-member assembly (The Daily Star, December 19, 2002). The Bush administration refused him a visa, blaming him for the pogrom in which 2,000 Muslims were killed, according to The Economist. “He may be a mass murderer,” opined Vir Sanghvi in the Hindustan Times, the newspaper he edits, “but he's our mass murderer.” This was a common reaction among Indians to the Bush administration’s decision. We have seen the role of intergroup bias, in which we are forgiving of our own group’s shortcomings and scathing about the outgroup’s misdeeds. Today, Narendra Modi is India’s prime minister.